Product Filters, Acyclicity and Suzumura Consistency by Bossert, Walter & Suzumura, Kotaro
Product Filters, Acyclicity and Suzumura Consistency∗
Walter Bossert
Department of Economics and CIREQ
University of Montreal
P.O. Box 6128, Station Downtown
Montreal QC H3C 3J7
Canada
FAX: (+1 514) 343 7221
e-mail: walter.bossert@umontreal.ca
and
Kotaro Suzumura
School of Political Science and Economics
Waseda University
1-6-1 Nishi-Waseda
Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 169-8050
Japan
FAX: (+81 3) 5286 1818
e-mail: k.suzumura@aoni.waseda.jp
This version: November 25, 2010
∗ Financial support from a Grant-in-Aid for Specially Promoted Research from the Min-
istry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology of Japan for the Project on
Economic Analysis of Intergenerational Issues (grant number 22000001), the Fonds de
Recherche sur la Socie´te´ et la Culture of Que´bec, and the Social Sciences and Humanities
Research Council of Canada is gratefully acknowledged.
Abstract. In a seminal contribution, Hansson (1976) demonstrates that the collection of
decisive coalitions associated with an Arrovian social welfare function forms an ultrafilter.
He goes on to show that if transitivity is weakened to quasi-transitivity as the coherence
property imposed on a social relation, the set of decisive coalitions is a filter. We examine
the notion of decisiveness with acyclical or Suzumura consistent social preferences and
without assuming that the social relation is complete. This leads to a new set-theoretic
concept applied to product spaces. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Nos.:
C02, D71.
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1 Introduction
Arrow’s (1951; 1963) theorem establishing the existence of a dictator as a consequence
of a set of seemingly innocuous properties of a social welfare function is the most fun-
damental result in the theory of social choice. Its conclusion depends crucially on the
assumption that the population under consideration is finite and alternative methods of
proof provided by authors such as Fishburn (1970), Sen (1979) and Suzumura (2000)
highlight the important role played by this finiteness property. Kirman and Sondermann
(1972) and Hansson (1976) consider the structure of decisive coalitions in the Arrovian
framework. A coalition (that is, a subset of the population) is decisive if its members can
always guarantee a strict social preference for any alternative over any other if all coali-
tion members have a strict preference for the former. Kirman and Sondermann (1972)
and Hansson (1976) establish that, in the general case where the population may be
finite or infinite, the set of decisive coalitions forms an ultrafilter, given that social rela-
tions are assumed to be orderings and Arrow’s axioms unlimited domain, weak Pareto
and independence of irrelevant alternatives are satisfied. In the finite population case,
all ultrafilters are principal ultrafilters, that is, they are generated by a singleton. This
singleton is, by definition of the decisiveness property, a dictator. Thus, the results of
these two papers generate Arrow’s theorem as a corollary. In contrast, if the population is
infinite, there exist non-principal ultrafilters and these ultrafilters correspond to decisive
coalition structures that are non-dictatorial. Kirman and Sondermann (1972) argue that
sets of decisive coalitions that are non-principal ultrafilters still have a dictatorial flavor
when expressed in a different space (leading to what they refer to as “invisible” dictators)
but this does not make the underlying social welfare functions themselves dictatorial; see
Hansson (1976) for a discussion.
There has been some renewed interest in specific applications of infinite population
Arrovian social choice, particularly in the context of infinite horizon social choice prob-
lems where the unidirectional nature of the flow of time permits some natural domain
restrictions; see, for instance, Ferejohn and Page (1978), Packel (1980) and Bossert and
Suzumura (2010b). In this paper, we reexamine Hansson’s (1976) approach from a differ-
ent perspective by relaxing the properties imposed on social preferences. As in the original
Arrovian setting, Hansson (1976) assumes in his first set of results that a collective choice
rule always generates orderings. Moreover, he considers the case where social preferences
are merely quasi-transitive but not necessarily transitive while retaining the richness prop-
erties of reflexivity and completeness. In this case, the family of decisive coalitions does
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not necessarily form an ultrafilter but it always is a filter. If the population is finite, the
corresponding collective choice rules are oligarchies.
Bossert and Suzumura (2010a, Chapter 10) provide a comprehensive analysis of the
resulting decisiveness structures when the requirements imposed on social relations are
relaxed. If reflexivity and completeness are dropped, the decisive coalition structures
resulting from Arrow’s axioms are the same for transitivity and for quasi-transitivity: the
family of decisive coalitions is a filter. As is the case for Hansson’s (1976) results, the
implications can be reversed in the sense that, for any given filter, there exists a collective
choice rule that generates transitive (and thus quasi-transitive) social preferences that
have this given filter as the family of decisive coalitions. A corollary of these observations
is that reflexivity and completeness are redundant when social preferences are assumed
to be quasi-transitive: the decisiveness structures are unchanged if these two richness
properties are added.
In this paper, we consider an environment where social preferences are assumed to
satisfy alternative weakenings of transitivity, namely, acyclicity or Suzumura consistency.
Acyclicity rules out the existence of strict preference cycles, whereas Suzumura consis-
tency (Suzumura, 1976) eliminates the existence of cycles with at least one strict prefer-
ence. Transitivity implies Suzumura consistency which, in turn, implies acyclicity. Quasi-
transitivity is intermediate in strength between transitivity and acyclicity as well and it
is independent of Suzumura consistency. In the case of a reflexive and complete relation,
transitivity and Suzumura consistency are equivalent.
Suzumura consistency is an interesting property because it is necessary and sufficient
for the existence of an ordering extension (Suzumura, 1976)—that is, a relation can be
extended to an ordering respecting all weak and strict preferences of the underlying rela-
tion if and only if the original relation is Suzumura consistent. This fundamental insight
represents a significant strengthening of the classical extension theorem established by
Szpilrajn (1930) who showed that transitivity is sufficient for the existence of such an
extension. Moreover, Suzumura consistency of a relation corresponds precisely to the
requirement that an agent with such a relation is not a ‘money pump’ according to a well-
known illustration of ‘incoherent’ preferences (Raiffa, 1968, p.78). See Bossert (2008) for
a brief overview of recent applications of Suzumura consistency.
Both acyclicity and Suzumura consistency are too weak to allow for the standard
notion of decisive coalitions. A coalition cannot be decisive in the usual sense in this
environment because its power to enforce a strict preference for an alternative over another
may depend on the preferences of the remaining members of society. Thus, a notion of
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decisiveness that applies to pairs of coalitions has to be employed. Consider a pair of
coalitions (M,M ′). The coalition M is said to be decisive against M ′ for a collective
choice rule if and only if the two coalitions are disjoint and, for each possible preference
profile, the social relation ranks an alternative x as better than an alternative y whenever
the set of those who strictly prefer x to y is given byM and the set of individuals who prefer
y to x is M ′. We define what we call a product filter and show that the collection of pairs
of coalitions with the above pairwise decisiveness structure is a product filter whenever
social preferences are required to be acyclical and the collective choice rule respects the
weak Pareto principle. Conversely, for any given product filter, it is possible to construct
a collective choice rule that satisfies weak Pareto and neutrality and, moreover, produces
Suzumura consistent social relations.
Two observations are worth pointing out at this stage. First, if social preferences are
not required to be reflexive and complete, acyclicity and Suzumura consistency cannot
be distinguished in terms of the pairwise decisive coalition structures they correspond to.
This parallels the observations of Bossert and Suzumura (2010a, Chapter 10) regarding
quasi-transitive and transitive social relations in the absence of reflexivity and complete-
ness. The second (and, to us, more striking) observation is that a product filter structure
allows us to generate collective choice rules that satisfy not only weak Pareto but also
neutrality. Note that this property is not required (and neither is the weaker axiom of
independence of irrelevant alternatives) when establishing that a product filter structure
results from assuming weak Pareto along with the acyclicity of the social preferences.
In the following section, we introduce our basic definitions. A brief summary of Hans-
son’s (1976) and Bossert and Suzumura’s (2010a, Chapter 10) results is given in Section
3. Acyclicity and Suzumura consistency are analyzed in the Arrovian setting in Section
4. In particular, we introduce a pairwise notion of decisiveness and a new product filter
concept. Section 5 provides a concluding discussion.
2 Relations and collective choice rules
Suppose there is an infinite set of alternatives X. We identify the population with the
set N , which is assumed to contain at least two individuals. N could be finite or infinite.
A (binary) relation on X is a subset R of the Cartesian product X ×X. For notational
convenience, we write xRy instead of (x, y) ∈ R. A relation R is asymmetric if and only
if, for all x, y ∈ X,
xRy ⇒ ¬ yRx.
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The asymmetric part of a relation R is denoted by P and the symmetric part of R is
I. If R is interpreted as a weak preference relation, P is the strict preference relation
corresponding to R and I is the indifference relation corresponding to R.
An ordering is a reflexive, complete and transitive relation. When R is an ordering,
we use chains such as, for instance, xPyIz to indicate that each of the three alternatives
x, y, z ∈ X is indifferent to itself, x is strictly preferred to y and z, and y and z are
indifferent.
A relation R is quasi-transitive if and only if its asymmetric part P is transitive, and
R is acyclical if and only if, for all K ∈ N and for all x1, . . . , xK+1 ∈ X,
xkPxk+1 for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} ⇒ ¬ xK+1Px1.
R is Suzumura consistent if and only if, for all K ∈ N and for all x1, . . . , xK+1 ∈ X,
xkRxk+1 for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} ⇒ ¬ xK+1Px1.
Transitivity implies quasi-transitivity which, in turn, implies acyclicity. Analogously,
transitivity implies Suzumura consistency, and Suzumura consistency implies acyclicity.
Without further assumptions, the reverse implications are not true and, furthermore,
quasi-transitivity and Suzumura consistency are independent. In the presence of reflexiv-
ity and completeness, transitivity and Suzumura consistency are equivalent.
It is assumed that each individual n ∈ N ranks the elements of X by means of
an ordering Rn with asymmetric part Pn and symmetric part In. A profile is a list
R = 〈Rn〉n∈N of orderings on X, one for each member of society. The set of all such
profiles is denoted by RN . For R ∈ RN and x, y ∈ X, the set of individuals who strictly
prefer x to y in the profile R is B(x, y;R) = {n ∈ N | xPny}.
B is set of all binary relations on X. A collective choice rule is a mapping g:RN → B.
An unlimited domain assumption is built into the definition of a collective choice rule: g
is assumed to produce a social ranking g(R) of the alternatives in X for every possible
profile R ∈ RN . For simplicity of exposition, we use R = g(R) to denote the social
preference relation associated with the profile R. The strict preference relation and the
indifference relation corresponding to R = g(R) are P and I. g is a Suzumura consistent
collective choice rule if and only if g(R) is Suzumura consistent for allR ∈ RN , and g is an
acyclical collective choice rule if and only if g(R) is acyclical for allR ∈ RN . Analogously,
g is a quasi-transitive collective choice rule if and only if g(R) is quasi-transitive for all
R ∈ RN , and g is a transitive collective choice rule if and only if g(R) is transitive for all
R ∈ RN . g is a social welfare function if and only if g(R) is an ordering for all R ∈ RN .
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Arrow (1951; 1963) imposed the axioms of unlimited domain, weak Pareto and inde-
pendence of irrelevant alternatives and showed that, in the case of a finite population,
the only social welfare functions that possess these three properties are dictatorial: there
exists an individual such that, whenever this individual strictly prefers one alternative
over another, this strict preference is reproduced in the social ranking, irrespective of the
preferences of other members of society. As mentioned above, unlimited domain is already
imposed by assuming that the domain of g is given by RN . Weak Pareto is the standard
unanimity property with respect to strict preferences.
Weak Pareto. For all R ∈ RN and for all x, y ∈ X,
B(x, y;R) = N ⇒ xPy
where R = g(R).
Independence of irrelevant alternatives demands that the social relative ranking of any
two alternatives x and y for any profile R depends on the individual relative rankings of
x and y in R only.
Independence of irrelevant alternatives. For all R,R′ ∈ RN and for all x, y ∈ X,
[xRny ⇔ xR′ny and yRnx⇔ yR′nx] for all n ∈ N ⇒ [xRy ⇔ xR′y and yRx⇔ yR′x]
where R = g(R) and R′ = g(R′).
A natural strengthening of this independence condition is neutrality. It requires that
social rankings do not depend on the labels of the alternatives.
Neutrality. For all R,R′ ∈ RN and for all x, y, x′, y′ ∈ X,
[xRny ⇔ x′R′ny′ and yRnx⇔ y′R′nx′] for all n ∈ N ⇒ [xRy ⇔ x′R′y′ and yRx⇔ y′R′x′]
where R = g(R) and R′ = g(R′).
3 Decisiveness, filters and ultrafilters
Let g be a collective choice rule. A set of individuals M ⊆ N (also referred to as a
coalition) is decisive for g if and only if, for all R ∈ RN and for all x, y ∈ X,
M ⊆ B(x, y;R) ⇒ xPy.
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The grand coalition N is decisive for any collective choice rule satisfying weak Pareto. If
there exists an individual n ∈ N such that {n} is decisive for g, individual n is a dictator
for g. Let Dg denote the set of all decisive coalitions for a collective choice rule g.
Weaker forms of decisiveness have been considered in the literature. Capitalizing on
Arrow (1951, p.53), Sen (1970, p.42) defines a coalition M ⊆ N to be almost decisive for
g if and only if, for all R ∈ RN and for all x, y ∈ X,
[B(x, y;R) =M and B(y, x;R) = N \M ] ⇒ xPy.
If a coalitionM is decisive for g, it follows thatM is almost decisive for g; this implication
is a direct consequence of the conditional nature of the decisiveness power expressed in
the above definition. Another class of conditional decisiveness notions, labeled potential
decisiveness, appears in Sen (1976, p.240).
A filter on N is a collection F of subsets of N such that
f.1. ∅ 6∈ F ;
f.2. N ∈ F ;
f.3. for all M,M ′ ∈ F , M ∩M ′ ∈ F ;
f.4. for all M,M ′ ⊆ N , [[M ∈ F and M ⊆ M ′] ⇒ M ′ ∈ F ].
An ultrafilter on N is a collection U of subsets of N such that
u.1. ∅ 6∈ U ;
u.2. for all M ⊆ N , [M ∈ U or N \M ∈ U ];
u.3. for all M,M ′ ∈ U , M ∩M ′ ∈ U .
Every ultrafilter is a filter as is shown for instance, in Bossert and Suzumura (2010a,
Chapter 2). The reverse statement is not true.
An ultrafilter U is principal if there exists n ∈ N such that, for all M ⊆ N , M ∈ U
if and only if n ∈ M . In this case, we say that U is generated by the singleton {n}.
Otherwise, U is a free ultrafilter. If N is a finite set, then all ultrafilters are principal.
If N is infinite, however, there also exist free ultrafilters but they cannot be defined
explicitly; the available proofs of their existence are non-constructive and rely on the
axiom of choice or similar properties.
Hansson (1976) has shown that if a social welfare function g satisfies weak Pareto and
independence of irrelevant alternatives, then Dg must be an ultrafilter on N . Conversely,
if U is an ultrafilter on N , then there exists a social welfare function g satisfying weak
Pareto and independence of irrelevant alternatives such that Dg = U .
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Hansson’s (1976) results allow us to obtain Arrow’s (1951; 1963) theorem for the spe-
cial case of a finite population: if the set of decisive coalitions contains a singleton {n},
individual n is a dictator. Because the set of decisive coalitions is an ultrafilter and all
ultrafilters are principal if N is finite, there exists an individual n who is a dictator.
In the infinite population case, a set of decisive coalitions that is a principal ultrafilter
corresponds to a dictatorship just as in the finite case. However, because not all ultrafil-
ters are principal if N is infinite, Arrow’s axioms allow for non-dictatorial social welfare
functions—namely, those whose sets of decisive coalitions correspond to free ultrafilters.
Hansson (1976) also examined collective choice rules with social relations that are
merely required to be quasi-transitive rather than transitive (but he retained the reflex-
ivity and completeness assumptions). In that case, the set of decisive coalitions Dg is
not necessarily an ultrafilter but it still is a filter whenever g satisfies weak Pareto and
independence of irrelevant alternatives. In analogy to the corresponding observation for
ultrafilters, for any filter F , there exists a collective choice rule g that yields reflexive, com-
plete and quasi-transitive social relations and satisfies weak Pareto and independence of
irrelevant alternatives such that Dg = F . When the population is finite, filters correspond
to collections of decisive coalitions that are oligarchies.
Bossert and Suzumura (2010a, Chapter 10) reexamine Hansson’s (1976) observations
involving transitive and quasi-transitive social relations satisfying the Arrow axioms in the
absence of reflexivity and completeness. Although the resulting decisiveness structures
can be recovered employing steps analogous to those that appear in Hansson (1976), there
is an interesting difference: once reflexivity and completeness are dropped, the families
of decisive coalitions associated with transitive collective choice rules and with quasi-
transitive collective choice rules can no longer be distinguished. Intuitively, this is the
case because only strict preferences are imposed by weak Pareto and, in the absence
of completeness, an absence of strict preference does not imply a weak preference in
the reverse direction. Moreover, as a corollary to these results, quasi-transitivity with
reflexivity and completeness is equivalent to quasi-transitivity without reflexivity and
completeness, whereas transitivity without reflexivity and completeness results in a weaker
structural property of the family of decisive coalitions—namely, the same structure that
obtains for quasi-transitivity. It is worth noting that decisive coalitions continue to be
well-defined; this is in contrast with the structure to be uncovered in the following section
where we consider acyclical and Suzumura consistent social preferences. Bossert and
Suzumura (2010a, Chapter 10) establish that if a quasi-transitive collective choice rule g
satisfies weak Pareto and independence of irrelevant alternatives, then Dg must be a filter
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on N . In addition, they show that, for any filter F on N , there exists a transitive collective
choice rule g that satisfies weak Pareto and independence of irrelevant alternatives such
that Dg = F .
4 Pairwise decisiveness and product filters
If, instead of transitivity or quasi-transitivity, acyclicity or Suzumura consistency is im-
posed on social preferences, the approach involving decisive coalitions and filters summa-
rized in the previous section must be amended. This is the case because the existence of
such coalitions is not guaranteed. A coalition cannot be decisive in the usual sense if a
social preference relation is required to be merely acyclical or Suzumura consistent be-
cause its power to enforce a strict preference for an alternative over another may depend
on the preferences of the remaining members of society. To deal with this observation,
we introduce a new set-theoretic concept that applies to pairs of coalitions—that is, we
formulate a filter structure for a product space.
Our new definition of decisiveness is a property of a pair of coalitions (M,M ′) with
M,M ′ ⊆ N . We say thatM is decisive againstM ′ for a collective choice rule g if and only
if the two coalitions are disjoint and the social relation declares x to be strictly preferred
to y whenever B(x, y;R) = M and B(y, x;R) = M ′. The set of pairs of coalitions
(M,M ′) with this property for a collective choice rule g is denoted by Ag. That is, for all
M,M ′ ⊆ N , we let (M,M ′) ∈ Ag if and only if
a.1. M ∩M ′ = ∅
and
a.2. for all R ∈ RN and for all x, y ∈ X,
[B(x, y;R) =M and B(y, x;R) =M ′] ⇒ xPy.
Clearly, if g satisfies weak Pareto, then the pair (N, ∅) is in Ag.
There is a connection between this new notion of pairwise decisiveness and Sen’s (1970)
almost decisive coalitions mentioned in the previous section: if M ⊆ N is almost decisive
for g, thenM is decisive against N \M for g. However, the definition of an almost decisive
coalition is silent about any decisiveness properties involving pairs (M,M ′) such that M ′
is not equal to the complement of M in N .
A product filter on N ×N is a collection W of pairs of subsets of N such that
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w.1. (N, ∅) ∈ W;
w.2. for all (M,M ′) ∈ W,M ∩M ′ = ∅;
w.3. for all K ∈ N and for all M1, . . . ,MK ,M1, . . . ,MK ⊆ N ,
(Mk,Mk) ∈ W for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} ⇒
(
∪Kj=1M
j,∪Kj=1M j
)
6∈ W.
There is a close conceptual link between filters and ultrafilters, on one hand, and
product filters, on the other. In particular, any filter on N (and, thus, any ultrafilter on
N) induces a product filter on N ×N in the following sense. Suppose F is a filter on N .
Define the collection W0F of pairs of subsets of N ×N by letting
W0F = {(M,M ′) |M ∈ F and M ′ ⊆ N and M ∩M ′ = ∅}.
To prove that W0F satisfies w.1, note first that, by f.2, N ∈ F . Furthermore, ∅ ⊆ N
and N ∩ ∅ = ∅. Thus, by definition of W0F , it follows that (N, ∅) ∈ W0F . w.2 is an
immediate consequence of the definition of W0F . Finally, to establish w.3, suppose that
K ∈ N and M1, . . . ,MK ,M1, . . . ,MK ⊆ N are such that
(Mk,Mk) ∈ W0F for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}.
By definition of W0F , this is equivalent to
Mk ∈ F and Mk ⊆ N and Mk ∩Mk = ∅ for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}.
If
(
∪Kj=1M
j,∪Kj=1M j
)
∈ W0F , we have
∪Kj=1M
j ∈ F and ∪Kj=1 M j ⊆ N and
(
∪Kj=1 M
j
)
∩
(
∪Kj=1 M j
)
= ∅.
By f.3,
(
∪Kj=1M
j
)
∩Mk ∈ F for any k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. But
(
∪Kj=1 M
j
)
∩Mk = ∅ for all
k ∈ {1, . . . , K} because
(
∪Kj=1 M
j
)
∩
(
∪Kj=1 M j
)
= ∅. This contradicts f.1.
Note that f.4 is not employed in the above argument. Thus, even a ‘weak filter’
structure that is obtained by dropping requirement f.4 is sufficient to induce a product
filter in the above described manner.
A few examples may be helpful in illustrating product filters and their relation to
filters and ultrafilters.
Example 1 Suppose 1 ∈ N and let
W1 = {(M,M ′) | 1 ∈M ⊆ N and M ′ ⊆ N \M}.
This is a product filter on N ×N that can be induced by the principal ultrafilter U1 on N
generated by the singleton {1}, that is, by U1 = {M ⊆ N | 1 ∈M}.
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Example 2 Let
W2 = {(N, ∅)}.
That W2 is a product filter on N ×N is straightforward to verify. Moreover, it is easy to
see that W2 is induced by the filter on N given by F2 = {N}.
Example 3 Suppose that 1 ∈ N and define
W3 = {(N, ∅)} ∪ {({1},M ′) |M ′ ⊆ N \ {1}}.
This is a product filter on N×N that is induced by the collection {N, {1}}. This collection
is an example of a ‘weak filter’ on N—that is, a collection of subsets of N that satisfies
f.1, f.2 and f.3.
Example 4 Suppose 1, 2, 3 ∈ N and let
W4 = {(N, ∅), ({1, 2}, N \ {1, 2}), ({1, 3}, N \ {1, 3})}.
It is straightforward to verify that this collection possesses the properties of a product filter
on N ×N .
We now obtain the following two theorems. When combined, they characterize acycli-
cal (or Suzumura consistent) unanimous and neutral social choice in terms of the resulting
pairwise decisiveness structure. As mentioned in the introduction, neutrality is not re-
quired in the first result and it follows in the second theorem as a consequence of the
product filter assumption.
Theorem 1 If an acyclical collective choice rule g satisfies weak Pareto, then Ag is a
product filter on N ×N .
Proof. Suppose g is an acyclical collective choice rule that satisfies weak Pareto. We
prove that Ag possesses the three properties of a product filter.
w.1. That (N, ∅) ∈ Ag follows from weak Pareto.
w.2. This property is an immediate consequence of a.1.
w.3. By way of contradiction, suppose that w.3 is violated. Then there exist K ∈ N and
M1, . . . ,MK ,M1, . . . ,MK ⊆ N such that
(Mk,Mk) ∈ Ag for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and
(
∪Kj=1M
j,∪Kj=1M j
)
∈ Ag.
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Let x1, . . . , xK+1 ∈ X and construct a profile R ∈ RN as follows. For all m ∈ ∪Kj=1M j,
let
x1Rm . . . RmxK+1 (1)
where, for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K},
[xkPmxk+1 ⇔ m ∈Mk] and [xkImxk+1 ⇔ m 6∈Mk].
Furthermore, for all m ∈ ∪Kj=1M
j, let
xK+1Rm . . . Rmx1 (2)
where, for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K},
[xk+1Pmxk ⇔ m ∈M
k] and [xk+1Imxk ⇔ m 6∈M
k].
To complete the definition of the preferences of the individuals in
(
∪Kj=1M j
)
∪
(
∪Kj=1M
j
)
,
let
xPmyImz
for all m ∈
(
∪Kj=1 M j
)
∪
(
∪Kj=1 M
j
)
, for all x ∈ {x1, . . . , xK+1} and for all y, z ∈
X \ {x1, . . . , xK+1}.
For all m ∈ N \
((
∪Kj=1 M j
)
∪
(
∪Kj=1 M
j
))
and for all x, y ∈ X, let
xImy.
Clearly, the profile thus defined consists of individual orderings. By definition,
B(xk, xk+1;R) =Mk and B(xk+1, xk;R) =Mk
for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. Thus, because (Mk,Mk) ∈ Ag by assumption,
xkPxk+1 for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. (3)
Because each member of ∪Kj=1M j belongs to at least one Mk (and, thus, strictly prefers
xk to xk+1), (1) together with the transitivity of individual preferences implies
x1PmxK+1
for all m ∈ ∪Kj=1M j. Analogously, because each member of ∪Kj=1M
j belongs to at least one
Mk (and, thus, strictly prefers xk+1 to xk), (2) together with the transitivity of individual
preferences implies
xK+1Pmx1
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for all m ∈ ∪Kj=1M
j. Finally, it is clear that
x1ImxK+1
for all m ∈ N \
((
∪Kj=1 M j
)
∪
(
∪Kj=1 M
j
))
and, thus,
B(xK+1, x1;R) = ∪Kj=1M
j and B(x1, xK+1;R) = ∪Kj=1M j.
By assumption,
(
∪Kj=1M
j,∪Kj=1M j
)
∈ Ag and, thus,
xK+1Px1
which, together with (3), contradicts the acyclicity of R = g(R).
Theorem 2 For any product filter W on N × N , there exists a Suzumura consistent
collective choice rule g satisfying weak Pareto and neutrality such that Ag =W.
Proof. Let W be a product filter on N ×N . Define a collective choice rule g by letting,
for all R ∈ RN and for all x, y ∈ X,
xRy ⇔ (B(x, y;R), B(y, x;R)) ∈ W. (4)
As an auxiliary result, we show that R = g(R) is asymmetric for all profiles R ∈ RN . By
way of contradiction, suppose that there exist R ∈ RN and x, y ∈ X such that xRy and
yRx. By definition of g,
(B(x, y;R), B(y, x;R)) ∈ W and (B(y, x;R), B(x, y;R)) ∈ W.
Letting K = 1, M1 = B(x, y;R) and M 1 = B(y, x;R), it follows that
(M1,M 1) ∈ W and (M1,M1) =
(
∪Kj=1M
j,∪Kj=1M j
)
∈ W,
contradicting w.3.
That g satisfies weak Pareto follows from w.1, (4) and the asymmetry of R = g(R).
To prove that g is neutral, suppose that R,R′ ∈ RN and x, y, x′, y′ ∈ X are such that
[xRny ⇔ x′R′ny′ and yRnx ⇔ y′R′nx′] for all n ∈ N.
This implies that B(x, y;R) = B(x′, y′;R′) and B(y, x;R) = B(y′, x′;R′). Hence, using
(4), we obtain
xRy ⇔ (B(x, y;R), B(y, x;R)) ∈ W
⇔ (B(x′, y′;R′), B(y′, x′;R′)) ∈ W
⇔ x′R′y′
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and
yRx ⇔ (B(y, x;R), B(x, y;R)) ∈ W
⇔ (B(y′, x′;R′), B(x′, y′;R′)) ∈ W
⇔ y′R′x′.
We now show that R = g(R) is Suzumura consistent for all possible profiles. Let
R ∈ RN , K ∈ N and x1, . . . , xK+1 ∈ X, and suppose that
xkRxk+1 for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. (5)
By (4) and the asymmetry of R, (5) is equivalent to
(
B(xk, xk+1;R), B(xk+1, xk;R)
)
∈ W for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}.
LetMk = B(xk, xk+1;R) andMk = B(xk+1, xk;R) for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. It follows that,
for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and for all m ∈ ∪Kj=1M j ,
[xkPmxk+1 ⇔ m ∈Mk] and [xkImxk+1 ⇔ m 6∈Mk].
Analogously, for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and for all m ∈ ∪Kj=1M
j,
[xk+1Pmxk ⇔ m ∈M
k] and [xk+1Imxk ⇔ m 6∈M
k].
Because individual preferences are orderings and each member of ∪Kj=1M j appears in at
least one Mk and, analogously, each member of ∪Kj=1M
j appears in at least one Mk, we
obtain
[
x1PmxK+1 for all m ∈ ∪Kj=1M j
]
and
[
xK+1Pmx1 for all m ∈ ∪Kj=1M
j
]
.
By definition of R and using the transitivity of individual preferences again, it follows
that x1ImxK+1 for all m ∈ N \
((
∪Kj=1 M j
)
∪
(
∪Kj=1 M
j
))
and, therefore,
B(xK+1, x1;R) = ∪Kj=1M
j and B(x1, xK+1;R) = ∪Kj=1M j.
By w.3,
(
∪Kj=1M
j,∪Kj=1M j
)
6∈ W and, thus,
¬ xK+1Rx1
by (4). Because R is asymmetric, this is equivalent to
¬ xK+1Px1.
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Thus, R is Suzumura consistent.
It remains to show that Ag =W.
Suppose first that (M,M ′) ∈ Ag. By a.1, M ∩M ′ = ∅. Let R ∈ RN and x, y ∈ X be
such that
B(x, y;R) =M and B(y, x;R) =M ′.
Because M is decisive against M ′ for g, it follows that xPy and hence xRy. By (4),
(M,M ′) ∈ W.
Finally, suppose that (M,M ′) ∈ W. By w.2, M ∩M ′ = ∅. Let R ∈ RN and x, y ∈ X
be such that
B(x, y;R) =M and B(y, x;R) =M ′.
By (4), xRy and hence xPy because R is asymmetric. Thus, M is decisive against M ′
for g, that is, (M,M ′) ∈ Ag.
We now return to the examples presented earlier in this section and illustrate some
collective choice rules that can be associated with the requisite product filters.
The product filter of Example 1 can be generated by a dictatorship of individual 1
defined by letting g1:RN → B be such that, for all R ∈ RN and for all x, y ∈ X,
xR1y ⇔ 1 ∈ B(x, y;R).
In Example 2, the Pareto (or unanimity) rule can be employed to induce (N, ∅) as the
only member of the requisite product filter. Formally, let g2:RN → B be such that, for
all R ∈ RN and for all x, y ∈ X,
xR2y ⇔ B(x, y;R) = N.
The product filter of Example 3 can be obtained from a collective choice rule such
that an alternative x is socially preferred to an alternative y if either individual 1 strictly
prefers x to y or there is unanimity regarding the strict preference for x over y. This
example combines an extremely asymmetric collective choice rule (a dictatorship) with
an extremely symmetric rule (the unanimity rule). Let g3:RN → B be such that, for all
R ∈ RN and for all x, y ∈ X,
xR3y ⇔ B(x, y;R) = {1} or B(x, y;R) = N.
Example 3 illustrates that if quasi-transitivity is weakened to Suzumura consistency, the
set of possible rules that is obtained becomes considerably more rich.
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A collective choice rule generating the product filter of Example 4 can be obtained by
letting g4:RN → B be such that, for all R ∈ RN and for all x, y ∈ X,
xR4y ⇔ B(x, y;R) = {1, 2} and B(y, x;R) = N \ {1, 2} or
B(x, y;R) = {1, 3} and B(y, x;R) = N \ {1, 3} or
B(x, y;R) = N.
The definition of g4 makes the decisiveness power of the coalitions {1, 2} and {1, 3} con-
ditional on the preferences of the other members of society: only if the entire complement
of {1, 2} (of {1, 3}, respectively) in N strictly prefers y to x and 1 and 2 (1 and 3, re-
spectively) strictly prefer x to y does g4 declare x to be socially better than y. For that
reason, Example 4 illustrates a product filter that cannot be induced by a filter or a ‘weak
filter’ employing the method outlined prior to the examples.
5 Conclusion
To the best of our knowledge, the notions of pairwise decisiveness and product filters
developed in the previous section have not appeared in the earlier literature. These new
structures appear to deserve further analysis. In particular, it might be of interest to
examine possible applications of product filters in areas other than collective decision
making.
As mentioned earlier, collective choice rules based on sets of decisive coalitions that
form ultrafilters or filters lead to straightforward special cases if the population is finite:
in essence, ultrafilters are associated with dictatorships, filters correspond to oligarchies.
There does not appear to be an easily identifiable reduction of possibilities where product
filter are concerned. As Examples 3 and 4 illustrate, there exists a variety of collective
choice rules that can be defined explicitly regardless of whether the population is finite
or infinite.
The results of this paper are established in a general framework where attention is
restricted to the axioms employed in Arrow’s impossibility theorem and neutrality. There
have been approaches that examine to what extent weakenings of the requirements im-
posed on social relations allow us to obtain collective choice rules that may have addi-
tional properties such as anonymity or compliance with the strong rather than merely the
weak Pareto principle; see, in particular, Sen (1969; 1970), Weymark (1984), Bossert and
Suzumura (2008). Bossert ad Suzumura (2010c) analyze social relations that are both
quasi-transitive and Suzumura consistent.
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